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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 920278-CA 
v. : 
DEMAR W. NILSON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal by the state of an order quashing the 
information and terminating the prosecution, entered by the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-
1(2)(c) (Supp. 1991) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the district court err in concluding that 
defendant's reprosecution was barred by the doublejeopardy 
doctrine, notwithstanding defendant's consent to the termination 
of the first trial? 
An appellate court reviews de novo questions of 
constitutional law such as a district court's grant of a motion 
to quash and dismiss an information on the ground of double 
jeopardy. United States v. Acruilar-Aranceta, 957 F.2d 18, 21 
(1st Cir. 1992). The district court's findings of fact are 
reviewed for clear error. State v. Friel, 500 A.2d 631, 634 (Me. 
1985). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. V: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, . . . nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law[.] 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-403 (1990): 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for 
one or more offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution 
for the same or a different offense arising 
out of the same criminal episode is barred 
if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an 
offense that was or should have been tried 
under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former 
prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order 
or judgment for the defendant that has not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that 
necessarily required a determination 
inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the 
subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution 
resulted in a finding of not guilty by the 
trier of facts or in a determination that 
there was insufficient evidence to warrant 
conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser 
included offense is an acquittal of the 
greater offense even though the conviction 
for the lesser included offense is 
subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution 
resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a 
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verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, 
set aside, or vacated and that is capable of 
supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty 
accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of 
prosecution if the termination takes place 
before the verdict, is for reasons not 
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place 
after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to 
try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is 
waived, after the first witness is sworn. 
However, termination of prosecution is not 
improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the 
termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to 
object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the 
record that the termination is necessary 
because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to 
proceed with the trial in conformity with the 
law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the 
proceeding not attributable to the state that 
would make any judgment entered upon a 
verdict reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out 
of the courtroom not attributable to the 
state makes it impossible to proceed with the 
trial without injustice to the defendant or 
the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree 
upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of juror on 
voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
Any other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules 
pertinent to the resolution of the issue on appeal aire contained 
in the body of this brief* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. First information. 
Defendant, a junior high school teacher, was charged 
with forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, in violation 
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of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1990), for fondling the genitals of 
one of his students, 14 year old J.H.f whom he invited to spend 
the night at his house. The information alleged that the abuse 
occurred on or between February 1, 1989 and April 30, 1989 (R. 
70a, 93). 
B. Motion to amend first information. 
A three-day jury trial commenced January 15, 1992. 
During the course of redirect examination on January 17, 1992, 
J.H. indicated for the first time that the abuse occurred in the 
spring of 1990, while he was in ninth grade (R. 71, 93-94). The 
state immediately moved to amend the information to conform to 
the evidence (R. 71, 94). Defendant objected to the proposed 
amendment on the ground that it would substantially prejudice his 
defense (R. 68, 94). The trial court denied the state's motion, 
finding that defendant would be prejudiced by the amendment (R. 
129). 
C. Dismissal of first information. 
The state then moved to dismiss and informed the court 
that it would file a new information alleging a 1990 time frame 
(R. 130). Defendant immediately stated that he had "no 
objection" to a dismissal (R. 130). The trial court granted the 
state's motion and the case was dismissed (R. 131). 
D. Second information. 
A second information was filed that same afternoon, 
January 17, 1992, alleging that the abuse occurred on or between 
February 1, 1990 and April 30, 1990 (R. 5). On February 18, 
4 
1992, defendant filed a motion to quash and dismiss the second 
information, alleging that his reprosecution for the offense 
constituted double jeopardy (R. 67-70). 
The matter came before the district court for hearing 
on February 26, 1992 (R. 2-4, 116). Both parties submitted 
memoranda (R. 70a-91, 92-115, 136-40). 
E. Quashal. 
On March 3, 1992, the district court filed a minute 
entry granting defendant's motion to quash and dismiss the second 
information (R. 125-26). The court concluded that reprosecution 
was barred because the second information alleged the same 
offense as the first information, notwithstanding defendant's 
undisputed consent to the prior termination (R. 125-26). A 
formal order of quashal was filed on March 24, 1992 (R. 144). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. First information. 
Defendant, a junior high school teacher, was charged 
with forcible sexual abuse for fondling the genitals of J.H., a 
14 year old student, whom he had invited to spend the night at 
his home (R. 70a, 92-93). Defendant suggested that he and J.H. 
sleep in defendant's bed together (R. 93). He also had J.H. 
undress to his underwear (R. 93). J.H. awakened later in the 
night when defendant put his hand into J.H.'s underwear and 
fondled his penis (R. 93). 
The information alleged that the abuse occurred on or 
between February 1, 1989 and April 30, 1989, and was based on 
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J.H.'s statements to Detective Mike Mitchell of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office during an interview on August 9, 1991 (R. 
92-93). J.H. informed Officer Mitchell that the abuse occurred 
two years earlier, approximately one month before Spring Break 
(R. 92-93). 
A preliminary hearing was held in circuit court on 
November 14, 1991 (R. 70a). J.H. again described the events he 
had related to Officer Mitchell, including his belief that the 
offense occurred in 1989, approximately one month before Spring 
Break (R. 67, 93). 
B. Jury trial on first information. 
On January 15, 1992, a three-day jury trial commenced 
in district court (R. 71, 93). During the course of direct 
examination on January 16, 1991, J.H. reiterated that the abuse 
occurred while he was in the eighth grade, in the spring of 1989 
(R. 71, 93). 
During cross-examination, defendant questioned J.H. 
extensively concerning the alleged 1989 time frame for the abuse, 
referring to "various events involving J.H. and defendant" (R. 
71, 93). By focusing "on the relative normalcy of [J.H.'s] life 
in 1989," defendant hoped to persuade the jury that the abuse 
could not have occurred in the spring of that year (R. 68). 
On redirect examination, the state attempted to clarify 
certain time frames which J.H. appeared to confuse during cross-
examination (R. 93-4). As a result of these efforts, it became 
clear that J.H. now believed that the abuse occurred not in the 
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spring of 1989, but in the spring of 1990 (R. 71, 93-94). 
C. Motion to amend first information. 
Based on the surprise change in J.H.'s testimony as to 
the date of the abuse, the state moved to amend the information 
to reflect a 1990 time frame (R. 71, 94). 
Defendant objected to the proposed amendment on the 
ground that he would suffer substantial prejudice (R. 68, 94). 
Defendant argued that his "entire defense, including the cross 
examination of [J.H.,] was premised on the relative normalcy of 
[J.H.'s] life in 1989[,] compared with a traumatic and turbulent 
1990—when he made several suicide attempts and entered therapy— 
to the end that a jury would not believe that the claimed 1989 
incident had occurred" (R. 68). Consequently, defendant's own 
cross examination of J.H. had effectively established a number of 
factors consistent with the abuse having occurred in the spring 
of 1990 (R. 68, 94). 
The trial court agreed that defendant would be 
prejudiced if the information was amended to reflect a 1990 time 
frame and denied the state's motion on that ground (R. 129). 
D. Motion to dismiss first information. 
Faced with the court's refusal to amend the 
information, and the victim's firm belief that the abuse had 
occurred in the spring of 1990, the state moved to dismiss the 
unamended information (R. 130). In so moving, the state informed 
the court that it would file a new information alleging a 1990 
time frame (R. 130) (a partial transcript of the proceedings 
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before the trial court on January 17, 1992 is contained in 
Addendum A). 
Defendant immediately stated that he had "no objection" 
to a dismissal of the case and the trial court granted the 
state's motion (R. 130-31; see Addendum A). 
E. Motion to quash second information. 
The state immediately filed a new information alleging 
that the abuse occurred on or between February 1, 1990 and April 
30, 1990 (R. 5). Defendant moved to quash this second 
information, admitting that while "[he] did not object to the 
dismissal," his reprosecution for the abuse nonetheless 
constituted double jeopardy (R. 68-69, 72) (defendant's complete 
motion and memorandum are found at R. 67-91). The state's 
memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion argued that 
reprosecution was proper because: (1) The second information 
alleged a different offense and thus did not constitute double 
jeopardy; (2) Even if it was the same offense, reprosecution was 
proper because defendant consented to the termination of trial 
prior to a verdict on the merits; and/or (3) Even if it was the 
same offense, reprosecution was proper because the previous 
dismissal was necessitated by the trial court's erroneous denial 
of the state's motion to amend the information, thus, there was a 
manifest necessity for the termination of trial (R. 92-115). 
During a hearing on the matter, defendant again 
emphasized that he "indicated no objection whatever" to the 
motion to dismiss (transcript of motion to quash hearing, 
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February 26, 1992 [T.] at 8). However, defendant asserted his 
belief that because the two informations charged the same 
offense, his reprosecution was barred on the ground of double 
jeopardy (T. 15-19). 
Following the hearing the state submitted a 
supplemental memorandum, drawing the court's attention to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1990), which governs the propriety of a 
subsequent prosecution for a previously dismissed offense. The 
state informed the court that reprosecution was proper under 
section 76-1-403(4)(a), because defendant consented to the pre-
verdict termination of his trial (R. 139-40). 
F. Quashal. 
After considering the arguments of counsel, as well as 
a partial transcript of the state's request for a dismissal and 
defendant's consent thereto in the first trial, the district 
court granted defendant's motion to quash and dismiss the second 
information (R. 125-26, 144) (copies of the court's minute entry 
and order of quashal are contained in Addendum B). The district 
court concluded that reprosecution was barred because the second 
information alleged the same offense as the first information (R. 
125; see Addendum B). 
In so ruling, the district court implicitly held that 
defendant's uncontroverted consent to the termination of his 
first trial had no bearing on the propriety of a second 
prosecution (R. 144; see Addendum B). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's consent to the pre-verdict termination of 
trial for this offense is undisputed in the record• When the 
state moved to dismiss the first informationf defendant 
immediately stated that he had "no objection." In moving to 
quash the second information, defendant acknowledged that "[he] 
did not object to the dismissal." During a hearing on the 
matter, defendant again emphasized that he "indicated no 
objection whatever" to the state's motion. 
The propriety of a subsequent prosecution following a 
pre-verdict termination of trial is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-403 (1990). Although the statute bars reprosecution 
following an improper termination of trial, it €*xpressly provides 
that a pre-verdict termination is not improper if "[t]he 
defendant consents to the termination[.]" Section 76-1-
403(4)(a). 
Section 76-1-403 is consistent with the double jeopardy 
clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
which similarly allows reprosecution under this circumstance. 
The purposes and policies of the jeopardy doctrine recognize that 
a defendant may reasonably determine that a pre-verdict 
termination of trial is preferable to the possibility of a 
conviction followed by a lengthy appeal and, if reversal is 
secured, by another trial. 
In failing to acknowledge that defendant's undisputed 
consent to the termination of the original trial for this offense 
10 
eliminates any double jeopardy claim under Section 76-1-403 and 
the double jeopardy clause, the district court applied the wrong 
legal standard for determining the propriety of a retrial. 
Consequently, the district court erroneously concluded that 
reprosecution was barred on the ground of double jeopardy. 
Because the record is replete with evidence of defendant's 
consent to the termination of the original trial, this Court 
should reverse the district court's erroneous order of quashal 
and remand this case for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S REPROSECUTION FOR THIS OFFENSE IS 
NOT BARRED BY THE JEOPARDY DOCTRINE BECAUSE, 
RATHER THAN PROCEED TO A VERDICT ON THE 
MERITS, HE CONSENTED TO THE TERMINATION OF 
HIS TRIAL 
The district court quashed the second information and 
dismissed the case against defendant based on its bare conclusion 
that reprosecution was barred on the ground of double jeopardy 
because the second information charged the same offense as the 
first information (R. 125-26, 144; see Addendum B). With the 
exception of the time frame alleged for the abuse to have 
occurred, the first and second informations charge identical 
conduct; thus, the state does not contest the district court's 
determination that the two informations charge the same offense. 
See Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402(3)(a) (1990);1 State v. Franklin, 
1
 Section 76-1-402(3)(a) provides: 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not 
be convicted of both the offense charged and 
11 
735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 1987) (offenses defined by the "same 
legal elements" are not "separate legal offense[s]" for purposes 
of double jeopardy). See also Mars v. Mounts, 895 F.2d 1348, 
1358 (11th Cir. 1990) (construing federal constitutional law, 
court held that informations and/or bills of particulars which 
"vary only in time periods alleged" constitute the same offense); 
Cueto v. Sinqletarv, 790 F.Supp. 1120, 1129 (M.D.Fla. 1991) 
(noting that the Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the 
argument that merely varying the dates of the indictment or 
information withstands double jeopardy scrutiny). C.f. State v. 
Hovt, 806 P.2d 204, 209 (Utah App. 1992) ("time and place, except 
insofar as pertinent to the statute of limitations, are not 
integral to a charge of child sexual abuse"). But see State v. 
Mars, 498 So.2d 402, 404 (Fla.) (applying Florida law which did 
not allow an indictment and/or bill of particulars to be modified 
by amendment, court found that facts in second indictment for 
murder prosecution would not have supported a conviction on the 
first indictment because the indictments alleged different time 
frames for the offense, thus there was no double jeopardy bar to 
retrial), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 929 (19871:2 State v. Beamon, 
the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: It is established by proof of 
the same or less than all the facts resquired 
to establish the commission of the offense 
charged[.] 
2
 The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Mars 
was, in essence, vacated on federal constitutional grounds by the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Mars v. Mounts, 
which ruled that double jeopardy bars successive* prosecutions 
which vary only in the time periods alleged in the pertinent 
12 
298 So.2d 376, 379-81 (Fla.) (where local rule precluded amending 
bill of particulars to conform to the evidence, court found no 
double jeopardy in second prosecution where first bill of 
particulars mistakenly limited charged offense to wrong date), 
cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975). However, the court's 
resultant conclusion that defendant could not be reprosecuted is 
erroneous. 
The issue is whether reprosecution for a previously 
dismissed offense is barred when the defendant consents to the 
termination of trial prior to a verdict on the merits• State v. 
Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1991) (reprosecution 
following discharge of jury without a verdict barred unless 
defendant consents to the discharge); State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 
354, 358 (Utah 1979) (discharge of the jury without a verdict 
operates as an acquittal unless the defendant consents). An 
appellate court reviews de novo questions of constitutional law 
bills of particulars. 895 F.2d at 1352, 1359. Accord Cueto, 790 
F.Supp. at 1129. 
Although the Eleventh Circuit was bound to accept the state 
court's construction of Florida statutes, it severely criticized 
the state court analysis as "a radical departure from that 
court's previous interpretation of [Florida's] variance theory.1' 
Mars v. Mounts, 895 F.2d at 1357. Specifically, the state court 
determined that the two indictments did not allege the same 
offense because of the variance between the time frames alleged. 
Id. In so doing, however, the state court failed to address the 
nature of Mars' acquittal and "completely abandoned" their 
previously made distinction between directed verdicts of 
acquittal based on a material variance (where reprosecution may 
be appropriate), and general acquittals which constitute a double 
jeopardy bar to retrial. Id. 
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such as a district court's grant of a motion to quash and dismiss 
an information on the ground of double jeopardy. United States 
v. Aquilar-Aranceta, 957 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1992). The 
district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. 
State v. Friel, 500 A. 2d 631, 634 (Me. 1985). Because the record 
on appeal is replete with evidence that defendant consented to 
the pre-verdict termination of his trial, the district court 
erred in concluding that reprosecution was barred by the jeopardy 
doctrine. 
A. Utah Code Ann. S 7 6-1-403 allows for 
reprosecution if the defendant consents to a 
pre-verdict termination of trial. 
The propriety of a subsequent prosecution following a 
pre-verdict termination of trial is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-403 (1990). See pp. 3-4 supra. The statute bars 
reprosecution following a pre-verdict termination of trial only 
when that termination was improper. Section 76-1-403(1)(b)(iii). 
The statute further provides that termination is not improper if 
,f[t]he defendant consents to the terminationf.]" Section 76-1-
403(4)(a). See Pearson, 818 P.2d at 584; Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 
358.3 
3
 A criminal trial may not be terminated prior to the 
verdict "without the defendant's request or consent," unless 
there is a "legal necessity" for the termination. Pearson, 818 
P.2d at 584. Because defendant consented to the termination of 
his first trial, this Court need not determine whether the 
termination was also justified by a "legal necessity." See 
Section 76-1-403(4)(c). 
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B. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth 
amendment to the federal constitution 
similarly allows for reprosecution if the 
defendant consents to a pre-verdict 
termination of trial. 
Section 76-1-403(4)(a) is fully consistent with 
interpretive case law from the United States Supreme Court 
recognizing that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth 
amendment to the federal constitution permits a new trial after a 
pre-verdict termination of trial when the defendant either 
requests or consents to the termination. United States v. 
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-07 (1976) (no double jeopardy bar to 
reprosecution where defendant requested mistrial); United States 
v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 94 (1978) (no double jeopardy bar to 
reprosecution where defendant requested dismissal). 
As further recognized in Dinitz and Scott, one of the 
primary purposes of the double jeopardy clause is to protect a 
defendant's right to have his trial completed by a particular 
jury. Dinitz 424 U.S. at 606; Scott 437 U.S. at 93. See United 
States v. Buliubasic, 808 F.2d 1260, 1266 (7th Cir.) (principal 
function of the jeopardy doctrine is to allow the defendant to 
get a verdict at the first trial if he wants one and to keep a 
verdict that is favorable), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987). 
Thus, when a trial is to be terminated prior to the verdict, the 
"important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the 
course to be followedf.]" Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609; Scott, 437 
U.S. at 93. 
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The Dinitz/Scott consent doctrine "has objectives not 
unlike the interests served by the Double Jeopardy Clause - the 
avoidance of the anxiety, expense, and delay occasioned by 
multiple prosecutions." Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 608. These cases 
recognize that a defendant may reasonably determine that 
continuing with a "tainted proceeding" will result in a 
conviction followed by a lengthy appeal and, if reversal is 
secured, by another trial. Ld. 424 U.S. at 610; 3 W. La Fave & 
J. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 24.2(a) at 68 (1984 & Supp. 
1991). The Dinitz/Scott reasoning logically applies to 
instances, like the present one, in which defendant did not 
request a pre-verdict termination of trial, but consented 
thereto. Under either circumstance, "it is highly significant 
that the defendant desired something other than 'to go to the 
first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an 
acquittal.'" 3 W. La Fave & J« Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 
24.2(a) at 68 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 
400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971)). 
C. Defendant's consent to the pre-verdict 
termination of his trial is undisputed in the 
record. 
The record on appeal amply demonstrates that defendant 
consented to the termination of trial and thereby relinquished 
his right to secure a verdict in that proceeding. As noted 
previously, when the state moved to dismiss the first 
information, defendant immediately stated that he had "no 
objection" (R. 130; see Addendum A). In moving to quash the 
16 
second information, defendant acknowledged that "[he] did not 
object to the dismissal," (R. 68-69, 72). During a hearing on 
the matter, defendant again emphasized that he "indicated no 
objection whatever" to the state's motion (T. 8). 
This Court should determine that defendant's 
undisputed, affirmative non-objection to the pre-verdict 
termination of his trial constitutes consent for purposes of 
Section 76-1-403(4)(a) and the double jeopardy clause. See 
BuHubasic, 808 F.2d at 1265 (assent may be given in many ways). 
Similar affirmative statements and/or conduct on the part of a 
defendant in consenting to a pre-verdict termination of trial 
have been held to vitiate any double jeopardy bar to retrial. 
People ex rel. Moslev v. Carey, 74 111.2d 527, 25 111.Dec. 669, 
387 N.E.2d 325, 328-29 (111.) (rejecting plea of double jeopardy 
where defendant affirmatively stated that he had no objection to 
previous declaration of mistrial), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 440 
(1979); United States v. DiPietro, 936 F.2d 6, 11-12 (1st Cir. 
1991) (retrial not barred by double jeopardy where defendant 
failed to object to mistrial declaration and participated in new 
trial setting); Camden v. Circuit Court of Second Judicial 
Circuit, Crawford County, Illinois, 892 F.2d 610, 615 (7th Cir.) 
(no double jeopardy bar to retrial where immediately following 
the declaration of mistrial defendant expressed gratitude to 
jury), cert, denied, 495 U.S. 921 (1990); United States v. Smith, 
621 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir.) (no double jeopardy bar to retrial 
where defendant did not object to mistrial ruling and 
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affirmatively indicated an understanding that there could and 
would be a retrial), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1087 (1981); United 
States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702f 705 (11th Cir.) (defendant's 
failure to timely object to mistrial vitiated any double jeopardy 
claim), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987). C.f« Ambrose, 598 
P.2d at 360 (where defendant arguably had no opportunity to 
object to mistrial declaration, Utah Supreme Court refused to 
accept defendant's "mere silence" as an implied consent to the 
termination of trial, thus retrial barred by double jeopardy). 
D. A proper safeguarding of the interests of 
the defendant and of the public reguires that 
they both be entitled to a determination of 
the merits. 
The procedural manipulation defendant has attempted 
here cuts against the purposes and policies served by the 
jeopardy doctrine. "Whether or not the defendant chooses to 
[obtain a final judgment] depends on whether she* feels she has 
been prejudiced so during the first proceeding as to deserve a 
new trial, not on whether or not the prosecution will once again 
bring charges." Aguilar-Aranceta, 957 F.2d at 22 n.8; Camden, 
892 F.2d at 618 (defendant cannot manipulate the events at trial 
to obscure his original implied consent to the mistrial). "The 
proper safeguarding of the interests of the defendant, and of the 
public, requires that they both be entitled to a determination of 
the merits." State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313, 
1315 (Utah 1974). Just as defendant "should not be convicted of 
crime upon technicalities or foibles of the law; []by the same 
measure, he should not be released on such grounds." Ld. To 
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disallow reprosecution here is to deprive the public of its 
"valued right to 'one complete opportunity to convict those who 
have violated its laws.'" Scott, 437 U.S. at 100 (quoting Arizona 
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)). 
If defendant truly desired an evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the original trial, he should have 
opposed the state's motion to dismiss, and asked for a ruling on 
the merits. "Whether the defendant wants a verdict is something 
he knows best, and when the occasion for choice comes he must 
choose[.]" Buliubasic, 808 F.2d at 1266; Anderson v. United 
States, 481 A.2d 1299, 1301 (D.C. App. 19.84) (having raised issue 
of prejudice, defense counsel was obligated to make clear her 
ultimate position concerning mistrial declaration). Having 
obtained a favorable, though erroneous, ruling from the trial 
court defeating the state's motion to amend the information,4 
defendant could have insisted on a verdict at that time. Dinitz, 
A
 The trial court abused its discretion in denying the 
state's motion to amend the information. Rule 4(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part: 
The court may permit an indictment or 
information to be amended at any time before 
verdict if no additional or different offense 
is charged and the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced. 
Although defendant argued that he would have been 
prejudiced by an amendment changing the time frame for this 
offense, such prejudice could have been cured by the subsequent 
declaration of either a continuance or a mistrial. State v. 
Leek, 85 Utah 531, 39 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1934) (once amendment 
had been made, had defendant so shown cause or reason why he was 
prejudiced or should not proceed with the trial, the court would 
have given the accused such reasonable time as necessary to meet 
any new matter set up in the amendment). 
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424 U.S. at 606, 609; Escobar v. O'Learv, 943 F,2d 711, 716 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (by indicating a desire to proceed, defendant invoked 
the right to obtain a verdict at the first trial). Because he 
instead chose to acquiesce in the termination of his trial, 
defendant cannot now claim the protections of the double jeopardy 
clause. Camden, 892 F.2d at 618 (where defendant made no record 
of his objection, nor suggested an alternative solution to the 
termination of trial, he cannot "avoid a second trial with a 
double jeopardy argument and thereby profit from his failure to 
act"); BuHubasic, 808 F.2d at 1266 (defendant failed to indicate 
that he wanted to finish trial and thus, "surrendered his 
opportunity to obtain a verdict . . . which is sufficient answer 
to his jeopardy contentions"). Ultimately, the protection 
embodied in the double jeopardy clause against repeated 
prosecutions for the same offense is a personal defense that may 
be foreclosed by a defendant's voluntary choices. United States 
v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 957 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1992). See 
Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.ll (rejecting idea that permissibility 
of retrial following a mistrial or reversal of conviction on 
appeal depends on a knowing waiver of a constitutional right). 
CONCLUSION 
The record is clear, defendant consented to the 
termination of his trial prior to a verdict (R. 130; see Addendum 
A). Consequently, he has not been deprived of his right to 
obtain a verdict and his reprosecution for this offense does not 
violate either Section 76-1-403 or the double jcjopardy clause. 
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To disallow reprosecution, on the other hand, is to deprive the 
public of its right to a determination on the merits. 
Inherent in the policy considerations underlying the 
jeopardy doctrine is the recognition that a defendant may 
reasonably determine that a pre-verdict termination of trial is 
preferable to the possibility of a conviction followed by a 
lengthy appeal and, if reversal is secured, by another trial. 
Thus, a defendant who consents to the termination of trial prior 
to obtaining a verdict may be retried without violating 
principles of double jeopardy. 
By failing to acknowledge that defendant's undisputed 
consent to the termination of the first trial for this offense 
eliminates any double jeopardy claim under Section 76-1-403 and 
the double jeopardy clause, the district court applied the wrong 
legal standard for determining the propriety of a retrial and 
erroneously concluded that reprosecution was barred. Because the 
record on appeal provides ample evidence of defendant's consent 
to the pre-verdict termination of his first trial, this Court 
should reverse the district court's erroneous order quashing and 
dismissing the second information and remand this case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 D aay of July, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
lIAN DECKER ' 
Aafeistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
V. 
DEMAR W. NILSON, 
DEFENDANT. 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE O^DJAJU- •_ 
Third Judicir.! C : ;tct 
MAR - 9 1992 
SALTt.Am:;_f. v 
CRIMINAL NO. 911901589 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, JUDGE 
JANUARY 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR 
FOR 
THE STATE: 
THE DEFENDANT: 
' 17, 1992 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY 
BY RODWICKE YBARRA 
DEPUTY SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ATTORNEY 
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
TENTH FLOOR WALKER CENTER 
175 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FRIDAY, JANUARY 17, 1992; P.M. 
2 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 (THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD IN OPEN 
4 COURT, OUTSIDE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY.) 
5 (PRESENT WERE THE DEFENDANT WITH COUNSEL, 
6 JO CAROL NESSET-SALE; AND ROD YBARRA REPRESENTING THE 
7 STATE.) 
8 I * * * 
9 THE COURT: THE COURT WILL RULE AT THIS 
10 TIME. 
11 THE COURT IS GOING TO DENY THE MOTION TO 
12 AMEND ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE DEFENDANT IS PREJUDICED 
13 BY THE FACT THAT WE HAVE ALLOWED DEFENSE TO PREPARE ON 
14 THE BASIS THAT THIS MATTER OCCURRED IN THE YEAR 1989, 
15 AND THE INTERROGATION OF THE DEFENDANT WILL BE HIGHLY 
16 PREJUDICIAL, IN THIS COURT'S OPINION, IN THE MANNER IN 
17 WHICH IT WAS ELICITED. AND I BELIEVE THAT DEFENSE 
18 COUNSEL HAS A RIGHT TO DEFEND THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE 
19 BEST OF HER ABILITY, AND I AM NOT SO SURE THAT TO ALLOW 
2 0 IT TO HAPPEN, FOR HER NOT TO RAISE THAT ISSUE, THAT THE 
21 ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL MAY NOT BE RAISED. 
22 AND SO, GIVING IT DUE THOUGHT, I'M GOING TO 
23 MAKE THAT RULING. AND IF YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO 
24 IT, FINE, YOU MAY DO SO AT THIS TIME. OTHERWISE, I'LL 
25 CALL THE JURY. 
(10129 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MS. NESSET-SALE: YOUR HONOR, I THINK YOU MAY 
HAVE MISSPOKEN ONE WORD. TO MAKE THE RECORD CLEAR, BY 
ELUCIDATION FROM THE "DEFENDANT," I BELIEVE YOU MEANT 
THE "VICTIM." 
THE COURT: VICTIM, I MEAN THE VICTIM. YES, 
VICTIM. 
MR. YBARRA: YOUR HONOR, BASED ON THAT 
RULING, THAT PUTS THE STATE IN THE POSITION OF 
ATTEMPTING TO PROVE SOMETHING WHICH AT THIS POINT, OF 
COURSE, IS IMPOSSIBLE. £UR VICTIM, WHO IS THE ONLY 
WITNESS THAT CAN ESTABLISH THE DATE, HAS NOW 
UNEQUIVOCALLY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO 1990. SO, 
THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE LUDICROUS FOR US TO CONTINUE 
FORWARD WITH THAT, KNOWING WHAT THE VERDICT WOULD BE, 
WHAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE. 
IN FACT, I SUPPOSE WE WOULD HAVE T O — THE 
COURT WOULD HAVE TO SUSTAIN A DIRECTED VERDICT ON 
MOTION OF DEFENSE. SO, THEREFORE, OUR ONLY REASONABLE 
COURSE IS FOR THE STATE TO MOVE TO DISMISS AND SIMPLY 
REFILE, CHARGING THE CORRECT DATE. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
THE COURT: WELL, AND I ALREADY— AND I 
ANTICIPATED THAT AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT MAY 
OCCUR, SO I WAS READY TO RULE ON THAT MATTER. 
(IU130 
2 
1 AND I AGREE WITH YOU, I WOULD HAVE NO OTHER 
2 CHOICE BECAUSE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND I WOULD HAVE 
3 TO GRANT A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
4 SO BASED UPON YOUR MOTION TO DISMISS, I WILL 
5 GO AHEAD AND DISMISS THE CASE. 
6 BRING THE JURY IN AND I'LL TAKE CARE OF IT. 
7 MS. NESSET-SALE: AFTER YOU EXCUSE THEM, I 
8 WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FURTHER RECORD ON THIS MATTER, 
9 AFTER YOU HAVE EXCUSED THEM. 
10 THE COURT: DO YOU WANT TO DO IT BEFORE? 
11 MS. NESSET-SALE: NO. 
12 THE COURT: IT CAN BE DONE AFTER. I WILL 
13 EXCUSE THEM. 
14 MS. NESSET-SALE: I'LL DO IT AFTER. 
15 (THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD IN OPEN 
16 COURT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY.) 
17 THE COURT: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE 
18 JURY, WHILE YOU WERE OUT A NUMBER OF THINGS HAVE 
19 OCCURRED. AND WE HAVE BAD SOME MOTIONS MADE THAT HAD 
2 0 I TO BE HEARD OUTSIDE OF THE EARS OF THE JURORS. 
21 BASED UPON THOSE MOTIONS AND MY RULINGS, THIS 
22 CASE HAS r.OMW Tft J\ ™«"»TTeT?Mi MTP THff PI 
23 axSJdXSSBB-: 
24 AS A RESULT OF THE DISMISSAL, I'M GOING TO 
25 EXCUSE YOU AND THANK YOU FOR BEING HERE. YOU HAVE BEEN 
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1 ATTENTIVE. IT HAS BEEN LONG AND HARD, BUT NEVERTHELESS 
2 YOU WERE VERY COOPERATIVE IN THE MANNER IN WHICH YOU 
3 CONDUCTED YOURSELVES. SO I HOPE I HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY 
4 OF HAVING YOU BACK IN MY COURT AGAIN AT SOME FUTURE 
5 DATE. 
6 SO WITH THAT, YOU WILL BE EXCUSED AND YOU 
7 WON'T HAVE TO APPEAR HERE AGAIN ON TUESDAY. 
8 ALL RIGHT. I WAS GOING TO SAY' IF THEY WANT 
9 TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT THE CASE, YOU CAN. BUT IN VIEW 
10 OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES— 
11 UNLESS THE TWO OF YOU DON'T WANT TO TALK TO 
12 THEM ABOUT THE PROSECUTION OF THE CASE, THAT'S UP TO 
13 THE TWO OF YOU, BECAUSE I USUALLY TELL THEM THEY CAN 
14 TALK TO THE ATTORNEYS, IF THEY WANT TO, AND I RECOMMEND 
15 THAT THEY DO. OTHERWISE, I SAY GO HOME. 
16 MR. YBARRA: IF THE JURY HAS ANY QUESTIONS 
17 FOR COUNSEL, I'LL BE GLAD TO STICK AROUND AFTER WE'RE 
18 FINISHED HERE. 
19 THE COURT: LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY TO YOU. 
2 0 USUALLY I RECOMMEND THAT JURORS TALK TO THE ATTORNEYS 
21 ABOUT THE CASE, BECAUSE THAT GIVES THEM SOME INSIGHT AS 
22 TO HOW THEY PERFORMED, AND SO FORTH. BUT IF YOU DON'T 
23 FEEL LIKE DOING THAT, YOU CAN GO HOME. IN FACT, YOU 
24 DON'T HAVE TO TALK TO ANYONE ABOUT THIS CASE. IT'S 
25 YOUR DECISION, IF YOU WANT TO. 
OU132 
1 AND SO WITH THAT, YOU MAY BE EXCUSED. IF YOU 
2 WANT TO REMAIN FOR THE REMAINDER OF WHATEVER IS GOING 
3 TO HAPPEN, YOU MAY DO SO. YOU'RE NOT BANNED FROM THE 
4 COURTROOM. 
5 MS. NESSET-SALE: YOUR HONOR, THE ONLY THING 
6 I WANTED TO MAKE SURE WAS CLEAR ON THE RECORD, I 
7 BELIEVE THE COURT SAID THAT HAD THE STATE NOT MOVED TO 
8 DISMISS THE CASE, THAT YOU WOULD HAVE GRANTED A MOTION 
9 FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE END OF THE STATE'S CASE. 
10 IS THAT WHAT THE COURT SAID? 
11 THE COURT: I SAID IF I HAD TO ENTERTAIN THAT 
12 MOTION, THAT IT APPEARED IN THIS CASE, BASED ON MY 
13 RULING, THAT WOULD BE ABOUT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE I 
14 WOULD HAVE HAD. 
15 MS. NESSET-SALE: BECAUSE THE STATE INDICATED 
16 WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO RETRY, AND APPARENTLY WE'RE 
17 GOING TO HAVE A BATTLE OVER WHETHER DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS 
18 ATTACHED. 
19 THE COURT: BASED ON IF WE HAD GONE FORWARD, 
20 BUT IN AS MUCH AS THEY MOVED TO DISMISS, THAT ISSUE IS 
21 MOOT. 
22 I MS. NESSET-SALE: CORRECT. 
23 THE COURT: I WANT TO MAKE SURE— 
24 MS. NESSET-SALE: IT IS MOOT AS FAR AS THIS 
25 COURT. I UNDERSTAND THAT. 
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THE COURT: I WANT YOU TO KNOW I ANTICIPATED 
THAT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED HAD WE PROCEEDED FORWARD. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: COURT'S IN RECESS. 
(THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.) 
f ,r i 'o$^ 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, AN OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY 
THAT I REPORTED THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER ON JANUARY 
17, 1992, AND THAT THE PRECEDING PAGES 1 THROUGH 6, 
INCLUSIVE, COMPRISE A TRUE AND CORRECT REPORTER'S 
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION OF SAID PROCEEDINGS. 
DATED THIS 21ST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1992, 
KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, C.S.R. 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, J MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEMAR W. NILSON, 
Defendant• 
Case No. 921900188 FS 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
The Court having heard argument and considered the 
various briefs and cases submitted in relation to the Motion to 
Quash the Information herein based upon a defense of double 
jeopardy and now being fully advised in the premises makes this 
its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court is of the opinion that double jeopardy in fact 
has attached in this case and that a second prosecution of the 
defendant for the same violation but alleged to be on a 
different date is in fact double jeopardy. The information 
herein shall therefore be quashed. 
I M > 1 ? 5 
STATE V. NILSON PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
The Motion of the defendant also sought sanctions under 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In reviewing all 
of the facts surrounding this instant case the Court is not of 
the opinion that the sanctions of Rule 11 should be applied to 
the prosecution. The actions of the prosector in filing the 
second infomration do not, in the Court's opinion, rise to the 
requisite level as required by Rule 11. Therefore, the Motion 
for Rule 11 Sanctions by the defendant is hereby denied. 
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate 
order. rr^ 
DATED this / day of March, 
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STATE V. NILSON PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry & Order, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this I day of March, 1992: 
Rodwicke Ybarra 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Attorney for Defendant 
10TH Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Thiro Judicial £.: r.ct 
MAR 2 <i 1992 
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE (2398) 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
10th Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-1555 
Facsimile: (801) 328-1419 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL M MTU I CI' COURT IM MIH I Ul 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF II'IAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pis : 
vs. 
DEMAR W, NILSON, 
Defendant, 
ORDER QUASHING 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 921900188 FS 
Judge Richard th Moffat 
Defendant's Motion to Quash tin? Information having ronm 
Scofewfea the memoranda - .d^ r law submittt v he Pd 
heard the arguments counse , i being . ;'y *lv\s*-
I 
on basis double jeopardy. Defendant notion 
sanctions is denied. 
1 1 ' m i II II in €s*<ri^ dav mi i II III.' I Il i i 
BY THE COURT: 
H'j 1 e 
g X r 3av 
s 
00144 
Approved as to form: 
Rodwicke Ybafcra 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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